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Abstract
In first-order logic, forward search using a complete strategy such as the inverse method can get stuck
deriving larger and larger consequence sets when the goal query is unprovable. This is the case even in trivial
theories where backward search strategies such as tableaux methods will fail finitely. We propose a general
mechanism for bounding the consequence sets by means of finite approximations of infinite types. If the
inverse method also implements forward subsumption and globalization, then the search space under this
approximation is finite. We therefore obtain a type-directed iterative refinement algorithm for disproving
queries. The method has been implemented for intuitionistic first-order logic, and we discuss its performance
on a variety of problems.
1 Introduction
In classical first-order logic, searching for a proof or for a refutation amounts to the same thing due to the
symmetry induced by an involutive negation. Classical theorem provers are therefore just as good at disproving
a false conjecture as proving a true conjecture: the same search strategy applies to either case. However, for
non-classical logics such as intuitionistic predicate logic, proof-search and refutation are drastically different. For
proving, the search procedure simply has to explore enough of the search space to find the proof—completeness
is not essential—but for refutations the procedure has to exhaustively search the entire space of derivations
to make sure that no proof exists. Since search spaces are generally infinite for undecidable logics such as
intuitionistic first-order logic, this kind of exhaustive exploration is challenging. The general technique is to use
a complete search procedure, where the proof of this completeness is external to the logic in question, and then
run the search algorithm to failure.
The inverse method [9] has proven to be one of the best search methods for both proof search and the above
kind of refutation by failure [14], at least on the problems drawn from the ILTP benchmark suite [15]. The
inverse method, like its classical cousins resolution [2] and superposition [1], has many desirable properties that
make proof search efficient, particularly the proof-reuse and variable-locality that is intrinsic to forward search
methods. The most powerful tool in the inverse method is subsumption, which discards any newly derived fact
that is simply an instance of a fact derived earlier. It is subsumption that makes the inverse method saturating
even for infinite search spaces.
In this paper we are interested in refuting unprovable conjectures in intuitionistic first-order logic. Unfor-
tunately, even for simple instances of such conjectures, the inverse method tends to run forever. Indeed, every
run of the inverse method can have one of three possible outcomes, of which only the first two are desirable:
1. Search finds a proof of the end-sequent.
2. Search saturates with no proof of the end-sequent.
3. Search continues indefinitely, neither finding a proof nor saturating.
As an illustration of this third possibility, consider the following simple axioms, which characterize the even
natural numbers:
E(z). ∀x. E(x) ⊃ E(s(s(x))).
In the focused version of the inverse method [4, 14], the above axioms would be transformed into the following
synthetic inference rules.
· −→ E(z)
· −→ E(x)
· −→ E(s(s(x)))
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Here, the x in the second rule signifies that this rule may match any instantiation of this variable. In contrast
to this, the z in the first rule is a ground constant term. Now, given the (unprovable) goal of showing that 3 is
even, i.e. · −→ E(s(s(s(z)))), the above rules can be combined to produce sequents of the following form:
· −→ E(s(s(z))), · −→ E(s(s(s(s(z))))), · −→ E(s(s(s(s(s(s(z))))))), . . .
and so on. At no point do we prove the desired goal, of course, but neither do we saturate. Indeed, if we were to
run this example through the Imogen prover [13], which currently solves the largest fragment of the first-order
ILTP problems, we would observe the looping behavior until all available memory is exhausted. Moreover,
this example does not stress any of the technological aspects of the inverse method implementation such as
the term-indexing, subsumption checking, or ordering heuristics; an implementation lacking any sophistication
would perform no worse than the most sophisticated of implementations.
In this paper, we show (in Secs. 4 and 5) how to adapt the inverse method (sketched in Sec. 2) in such a
way the core proof search procedure always terminates with one of the following outcomes:
1. Saturation without proof – in which case the conjecture is not provable.
2. Discovery of a sound proof – in which case the conjecture is provable.
3. Discovery of an unsound proof.
The third outcome is interesting. A priori it would seem that an “unsound proof” is completely useless, as
it neither proves the goal nor disproves the existence of a valid proof. In fact there is useful information to
be extracted from such proofs. As we shall see in Sec. 6, the exact nature of the unsoundness can be used to
automatically refine our conjecture in such a way that if we rerun our proof search it is now guaranteed to
avoid proofs that use that particular instance of unsound reasoning. Of course, this process of refinement may
need to be be repeated indefinitely, and because of undecidability, it may never terminate with a sound proof
or saturate without proof. Each round of the procedure, however, is guaranteed to terminate, and for problems
like the one above we do eventually find a refutation.
2 Background: Forward Search Using the Inverse Method
We begin with a quick sketch of the inverse method for first-order intuitionistic logic. A comprehensive descrip-
tion of the inverse method, including its history and its applicability to a variety of logics, can be found in [9].
In this work we will use a focused and polarized version of the method based on the design explained in more
detail in [4, 13, 14]. Focusing and polarities are greatly beneficial for exploiting the technique outlined in this
paper to the fullest, but they are not essential; moreover, they are now standard and well-documented concepts
of structural proof theory [6, 10].
Our language consists of standard first-order terms (written s, t, . . . ) and formulas (written A,B, . . . ) that
are built with the following grammar:
s, t, . . . ::= x | f(t1, . . . , tn)
A,B, . . . ::= p(t1, . . . , tn) | A ⊃ B | A ∧ B | ⊤ | A ∨B | ⊥ | ∀x.A | ∃x.A
Here, f, g, . . . ranges over function symbols, p, q, . . . over predicate symbols, and x, y, . . . over variables. We will
use P,Q, . . . to denote atomic formulas, i.e., formulas of the form p(t1, . . . , tn). We assume that function and
predicate symbols are simply typed, and that all well-formed formulas are also well-typed. This in turn uniquely
determines a type for all variables. For the time being, we omit these types from the depictions of formulas and
terms; we will revisit them in Sec. 4. Following standard practice, we omit parentheses for nullary predicate and
function symbols. Specific concrete function and predicate symbols will be written in a monospaced font. For
a function symbol f , we write fn(t) to stand for t if n = 0 and for f(fn−1(t)) if n > 0. For intuitionistic logic,
the above collection of formula constructors has the property that no connective is definable in terms of the
others. On the other hand, negation ¬A is defined to be A ⊃ ⊥, and equivalence A ≡ B as (A ⊃ B)∧ (B ⊃ A).
Provability of sequents will be given in terms of a forward version of Gentzen’s sequent calculus LJ, which
we call FJ. An FJ sequent is of the form Γ −→ γ where Γ, called the context, is a multiset of formulas and γ,
called the conclusion, is either · or a formula. The rules of FJ are depicted in Figure 1.
Definition 1 (Notational Conventions in Figure 1).
• In the ∨L rule: γ1 ∪ γ2 =


γ1 if γ2 = ·
γ2 if γ1 = ·
C if γ1 = γ2 = C.
The rule is inapplicable if γ1 and γ2 are different formulas.
• In the ⊃R rule, we assume that Γ \{A}( Γ or γ = B.
• In the ∀R{x}and ∃L{x} rules, the variable x is not free in the conclusion.
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[
Γ, P −→ γ
uL
Γ, P ′ −→ γ
Γ −→ P
uR
Γ −→ P ′
]
init
P −→ P
Γ, A,A −→ γ
factor
Γ, A −→ γ
Γ1 −→ A Γ2 −→ B
∧R
Γ1,Γ2 −→ A ∧ B
Γ, A −→ γ
∧L1
Γ, A ∧B −→ γ
Γ, B −→ γ
∧L2
Γ, A ∧B −→ γ
⊤R
· −→ ⊤
Γ −→ γ
⊃R
Γ\{A} −→ A ⊃ B
Γ1 −→ A Γ2, B −→ γ
⊃L
Γ1,Γ2, A ⊃ B −→ γ
Γ1, A −→ γ1 Γ2, B −→ γ2
∨L
Γ1,Γ2, A ∨B −→ γ1 ∪ γ2
Γ −→ A
∨R1
Γ −→ A ∨ B
Γ −→ B
∨R2
Γ −→ A ∨B
⊥L
⊥ −→ ·
Γ −→ A
∀R{x}
Γ −→ ∀x.A
Γ, [t/x]A −→ γ
∀L
Γ,∀x.A −→ γ
Γ −→ [t/x]A
∃R
Γ −→ ∃x.A
Γ, A −→ γ
∃L{x}
Γ,∃x.A −→ γ
Figure 1: FJ, a forward sequent calculus for intuitionistic first-order logic. Note the conventions in Defn. 1. The
uL and uR rules are not part of FJ and will be explained in Sec. 5.
The distinguishing feature of FJ is that every element of Γ is necessary in the proof of Γ −→ γ, i.e., this
calculus actually encodes a strict or relevant logic. Full intuitionistic truth is then recovered by means of
subsumption.
Definition 2 (Substitutions). A substitution θ is a finite mapping from variables to terms such that no variable
in its domain occurs among the terms in its range.1 For any variable x, we write x[θ] to stand for x if x /∈ dom(θ),
and for θ(x) otherwise. Given a syntactic construct X (term, formula, sequent, etc.), we write X [θ] for the
result of replacing every free variable x in X by x[θ], avoiding capture by α-varying X if needed.
Definition 3 (Subsumption). The sequent Γ1 −→ γ1 subsumes Γ2 −→ γ2 iff there is a substitution θ such
that Γ1[θ] ⊆ Γ2 and γ1[θ] ⊆ γ2, where ⊆ is interpreted as set-inclusion, i.e., Γ1 ⊆ Γ2 iff for every A ∈ Γ1 also
A ∈ Γ2. This notion is naturally generalized to sets of sequents.
Definition 4 (Derivability). The sequent Γ0 −→ γ0 is derivable if there is an FJ derivation of Γ −→ γ (for
some Γ and γ) that subsumes Γ0 −→ γ0.
Note that this calculus is cut-free, and hence enjoys a subformula property: every sequent in a derivation
is built out of (signed) subformulas of the end-sequent. The inverse method makes use of this property of
the forward calculus by following the “recipe” outlined in [9]. In rough outline, ground sequents are lifted to
sequents with free term variables, and identity of terms and formulas is replaced by unification and considering
the most general common instance, computed using most general unifiers (mgus). Here are three particular but
characteristic examples of lifted rules:
Γ, A,A′ −→ γ
θ = mgu(A,A′)
factor
(Γ, A −→ γ)[θ]
Γ1 −→ A
′ Γ2 −→ B
′
θ = mgu(A′ ∧ B′, A ∧B)
∧R
(Γ1,Γ2 −→ A ∧B)[θ]
Γ −→ A′
θ = mgu(A′, A)
∃R
(Γ −→ ∃x.A)[θ]
The subformula property allows all the lifted rules to be further specialized to the signed subformulas of
an end-sequent, which we denote by Γ0 −→ γ0 in the rest of this paper. Specifically, the principal formulas in
each case (the unprimed formulas in the example rules above) are freely occurring signed subformulas of the
end-sequent. In particular, the initial sequents produced by init correspond to the atomic formulas that occur
both positively and negatively signed in the end-sequent. We say that these initial sequents and specialized
inference rules are based on the end-sequent.
Search begins from an initial set of support (SOS) consisting of the initial sequents based on the end-sequent.
Then, in each iteration of the inner loop, a sequent is selected from the SOS and moved into the active set;
each specialized rule based on the end-sequent is then applied in such a way that at least one of its premises
is the selected sequent and the other premises are drawn from the active set. Every conclusion of these rule
applications is then tested for subsumption against all the sequents derived earlier; any new sequents that are
not subsumed are inserted back into the SOS.2 As long as the selection of sequents from the SOS is fair—every
sequent is eventually selected—the search method is complete, i.e., it will eventually derive a sequent that
subsumes the end-sequent if it is provable. This core prover loop is essentially unchanged from the days of the
Otter resolution prover, and is therefore often called the Otter loop. When the SOS becomes empty without
1In other words, substitutions are idempotent.
2This is sometimes called forward subsumption to distinguish it from the opposite operation: deleting an earlier sequent from the
SOS and active sets if it is subsumed by a newly derived sequent, known as back-subsumption. While this is critical for performance,
back-subsumption is not essential for this paper, so we will use “subsumption” in this paper to mean forward subsumption.
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the end-sequent being subsumed, we say that search has saturated, which in turn means that the end-sequent is
refuted—not derivable—and hence the end-sequent does not denote a true formula of intuitionistic first-order
logic.
We make two modifications to the standard Otter loop. First, we apply the factor rule eagerly on every
computed sequent, storing each intermediate result (if not subsumed) in the SOS, until factor is longer applicable.
Thus, we never need to consider applying factor to any selected sequent. Second, we add the following rule,
which is easily seen to be admissible:
Γ, A′ −→ γ A ∈ Γ0 θ = match(A
′, A)
global
(Γ −→ γ)[θ]
Here, we write match(A′, A) to stand for the most general substitution θ for which A′[θ] = A. The effect of this
rule is to treat every element of Γ0 as implicitly present in the context of every derived sequent. In fact, we will
consider this rule as implicitly applied to the principal formula of every computed sequent, which is sometimes
called globalization [4, 14].
3 Guaranteeing Termination – Informally
Our aim in this paper is to build a variant of the inverse method where the Otter loop for any end-sequent
terminates, either by producing a proof or by saturating. In broad terms, our method is based on building
an over-approximation of the set of derivable sequents from the initial sequents based on the end-sequent.
Importantly, we retain completeness by this over-approximation, so our method can be validly used to refute
goals. Indeed, we will sacrifice soundness to obtain this over-approximation.
In our particular case, the over-approximation comes in the form of weakening the end-sequent that the
specialized rules are based on. It is immediate that if Γ −→ A is derivable, then Γ,Γ′ −→ A is as well, and
hence if we succeed in refuting the latter sequent, then the former sequent cannot be derivable. In backward
search procedures, reasoning from end-sequent upwards to the initial sequents, applying weakening is generally
bad for performance: it can only create more backtrack points for the prover. For forward search, however, there
is no backtracking; indeed, having more assumptions in the basis can produce initial sequents that subsume
(and hence filter out) sequents that may otherwise end up in the SOS. Because subsumption is used in such a key
fashion, it is perhaps instructive to think of it in terms of the following intuition: a variable subsumes all instances
of said variable. Thus, if x is a variable, then the sequent Γ, E(s(x)) −→ · subsumes, e.g., Γ,Γ′, E(s(x)) −→ ·
and Γ, E(s(s(z))) −→ A.
To see a concrete illustration of this approach, let us revisit the example from the introduction. We will
modify the end-sequent by adding the assumption, P4, that all numbers greater than four are even, so we base
the initial sequents and specialized rules on:
∀x. E(s4(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
P4
, E(z), ∀x. E(x) ⊃ E(s2(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ0
−→ E(s3(z)).
For the sake of simplicity, this assumption is slightly weaker than the ones we use in the rest of the paper. The
full method we propose would rather add the assumption “if there exists an even number greater than four,
then all numbers greater than four are even.”
As explained earlier, these hypotheses are used to specialize the inference rules. In the presence of spe-
cialization, focusing, and globalization, we effectively have only the following derived (or synthetic) inference
rules:
· −→ E(s4(x)) · −→ E(z)
· −→ E(y)
· −→ E(s2(y))
The first two rules actually give rise to two (lifted) sequents. If the first of these sequents is applied to the
third rule, we obtain · −→ E(s6(x)), which is subsumed by the first sequent. If we try the second of the above
sequents with the third rule, we obtain, successively, the sequents · −→ E(s2(z)) and · −→ E(s4(z)); the former
fits the premise of no other rule and the latter is subsumed by the first sequent. We have then exhausted all
possibilities for combining the above rules, so search terminates without finding a proof of P4,Γ0 −→ E(s
3(z)).
By completeness it now follows that this sequent was not derivable in the first place, so neither was Γ0 −→
E(s3(z)).
This result may seem somewhat surprising. By adding more hypotheses—which one would na¨ıvely assume
just leads to more sequents being derivable—we are actually able to drastically decrease the size of the search
space. Why did this happen, and how did we discover this particular weakening of the end-sequent? We shall
explain this in the next two sections by showing how the forward search space can be guaranteed to be finite.
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4 Cofinite Covers
As already mentioned in Sec. 2, we will assume that our function and predicate symbols have simple types. To
every function symbol, we associate a type which we will write as T1 × · · · × Tn → T , and to every predicate
symbol, we will associate a type written as T1 × · · · × Tn → o, where n is the arity of the function or predicate,
and Ti is the type of the ith argument of the function or predicate. We use o for the “type” of formulas. For
constant function symbols, we elide the arrow. In the following we will only consider terms and atoms that are
well-formed i.e., all terms occurring in these must obey the typing discipline. We also assume that all types are
inhabited, as uninhabited types are never needed in a proof.
As an example, consider the following signature which defines types for the natural numbers, lists of numbers,
and an append predicate:
z : nat. s : nat → nat. nil : list.
cons : nat× list → list. append : list× list× list → o.
A benefit of this representation is that nonsensical terms such as s(nil) are not possible to construct. Note
that by collapsing all types into a single type, we get a system that is essentially equivalent to ordinary untyped
first-order logic. If we do have types at our disposal, however, the efficiency of our approach is greatly improved.
For many untyped problems, it is possible to infer nontrivial typing information from the given formulas, e.g.
using the method presented in [8].
The main construction of this section is a form of case analysis on terms, where we allow splitting a single
occurrence of a variable of a given type T into all possible function symbols with codomain T . To fully describe
this operation, we would therefore need to keep track of which variables occur where, and what the types of
these variables are. In our case, however, all variables may be assumed to be distinct, and we may therefore
use the following more parsimonious notation in our presentation of the splitting procedure:
Definition 5 (Free terms and atoms). The free terms and free atoms are generated by the following grammar.
t¯ ::= T | f〈t¯1, . . . , t¯n〉 P¯ ::= P 〈t¯1, . . . , t¯n〉
The formation of free terms and atoms should respect the types, thus f〈t1, . . . , tn〉 and P 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 are well-
formed if and only if for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, ti is a well-formed free term of type Ti. For the purposes of this definition,
T is considered a well-formed free term of type T .
Intuitively, a free atom should be interpreted as representing any instantiation of the base types present in
the atom. In other words, the free atom append〈cons〈nat, list〉, list, list〉 should be seen as representing
the atomic formula append(cons(n, l1), l2, l3) for any n of type nat and l1, l2, l3 of type list.
More formally, we define the following relationship between terms, atoms and their free counterparts.
Definition 6 (Instance of free term/atom). A term t is said to be an instance of a free term t¯ if one of the
following holds:
1. t¯ = T , and t is a term with type T , or
2. t¯ = f〈t¯1, . . . , t¯n〉, t = f(t1, . . . , tn) and for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ti is an instance of t¯i.
The atom P (t1, . . . , tn) is said to be an instance of the free atom P 〈t¯1, . . . , t¯n〉 if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ti is an
instance of the free term t¯i.
The main goal will be showing that for every predicate symbol P we can find a suitable collection ΓP of free
atoms such that all but finitely many instances of P are instances of some free atom in ΓP .
To express this more formally, we first introduce the concept of linear contexts:
Definition 7 (Linear context in free term/atom). The following grammar defines the notion of a free term or
atom with a specific chosen subterm
t¯[−] ::=  | f〈t¯1, . . . , t¯i[−], . . . , t¯n〉
P¯ [−] ::= P 〈t¯1, . . . , t¯i[−], . . . , t¯n〉
With linear contexts there is a natural notion of substitution, defined by the following equations:
[t¯ ] = t¯
f〈t¯1, . . . , t¯i[−], . . . , t¯n〉[t¯ ] = f〈t¯1, . . . , t¯i[−][t¯ ], . . . , t¯n〉
P 〈t¯1, . . . , t¯i[−], . . . , t¯n〉[t¯ ] = P 〈t¯1, . . . , t¯i[−][t¯ ], . . . , t¯n〉
Definition 8 (Free instance of function/predicate). For any function symbol f with type T1 × · · · × Tn → T ,
we define the free instance of f to be the free term f〈T1, . . . , Tn〉. We let ϕ denote the function that maps a
function symbol to its free instance. Similarly, for any predicate symbol P with type T1× · · ·×Tn → o we define
its free instance to be ϕ(P ) = P 〈T1, . . . , Tn〉.
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Note that any instance of a predicate P is also an instance of ϕ(P ).
Based on the above definition, we can now present a notion of coverage, relating a free atom to a set of free
atoms with the same instances. First, we define the set of splitting candidates :
Definition 9 (Splitting candidates). The set SC(T ) for a type T is given by
SC(T ) = {f | f : T1 × · · · × Tn → T }
Definition 10 (Coverage). We say that Γ¯ covers P¯ , if Γ¯ ⊲ P¯ holds, where this judgment is defined using the
following inference rules
imm
P¯ ⊲ P¯
∀f ∈ SC(T ). Γ¯f ⊲ P¯ [ϕ(f)]
split⊎
f∈SC(T )
Γ¯f ⊲ P¯ [T ]
Here, the second rule has a varying number of premises depending on the type T . The ⊎ signifies that the
contexts in the premises are combined using multiset union to form the context in the conclusion.
Note that by construction, any instance of P¯ [ϕ(f)] is an instance of P¯ [T ].
Definition 11 (Ground cover). If a free atom P¯ contains only function symbols, we say that it is a ground
cover. In this case, there is exactly one ground atom P such that P is an instance of P¯ .
As an example of the above definitions, consider a unary predicate P over nat. In this case, we can derive
P 〈z〉, P 〈s〈z〉〉, P 〈s〈s〈nat〉〉〉 ⊲ P 〈nat〉,
and among the three covering free atoms, the first two are ground covers.
Remark 12. If a type T has only finitely many inhabitants, it is never necessary to split on this type. It is
therefore possible to extend the above definition to include free atoms that contain only function symbols or finite
types without changing the properties of these covers.
We may now define formally the notion of a set of free atoms that cover all but finitely many ground instances
of a predicate.
Definition 13 (Cofinite cover). We say that Γ¯ is a cofinite cover for P¯ if Γ¯, Γ¯′ ⊲ P¯ where Γ¯′ contains only
ground covers, and Γ¯ contains no ground covers. We write this as Γ¯◮ P¯ .
Note that as our goal is to cover all but finitely many ground instances, we may as well discard all instances
that happen to have a ground cover.
As an example, we have P 〈s〈s〈nat〉〉〉◮P 〈nat〉. Any ground instance of P : nat→ o is of the form P (sn(z))
for some n, and all but P (z) and P (s(z)) are instances of P 〈s〈s〈nat〉〉〉.
5 Termination
We are now in a position to explain the uL and uR rules from Figure 1. First of all, we will assume there is a
fixed finite set of free atoms Γ¯. The only side-condition on the uL/uR rule is now that whenever it is applied,
both P and P ′ must be instances of the same free atom P¯ ∈ Γ¯. For the uR rule, this has the following effect:
during forward proof search, the rule only gets applied if we manage to prove Γ −→ P where P is an instance
of P¯ . If Γ −→ P is never derived, then the rule never becomes active, and thus does not influence proof search.
If on the other hand the rule becomes active, we can now immediately derive Γ −→ P ′ for all instances P ′ of P¯ .
In a sense, the free atoms act as sentinels that watch over an infinite set of instances. If the sentinel becomes
active, it immediately subsumes any instances inside the set it is watching over. As we will show in this section,
as long as these sentinels form a cofinite cover, proof search is guaranteed to terminate. Of course, extending
the FJ calculus with this unfamiliar construct may seem a bit complicated, but as we shall see in Sec. 7, the
complexity is in fact only skin deep, as the behavior of these rules can be implemented in terms of the usual
rules of the calculus.
Definition 14 (Augmented sequents). We say that a sequent Γ −→ A is augmented with Γ¯ if Γ¯ = Γ¯P1 , . . . , Γ¯Pn ,
where P1, . . . , Pn are all the predicate symbols occurring in Γ and A, and Γ¯Pi ◮ ϕ(Pi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Note that any sequent Γ −→ A can be turned into an augmented sequent by letting Γ¯ consist of ϕ(P ) for
all predicate symbols P occurring in Γ and A.
Theorem 15 (Termination). The inverse method is terminating for the end-sequent Γ0 −→ γ0 augmented with
Γ¯0; that is to say, the iterated consequences of all initial sequents based on this end-sequent is a finite set.
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sketch. It is sufficient to show that only finitely many distinct collections of atoms may be derived before the
set of iterated consequences of the initial sequents is saturated. Every lifted inference rule is of the form:
Γ1 −→ A1 · · · Γn −→ An
{Ψ}
Γ −→ A
for which the variables in Ψ can be instantiated with any terms. Note, however, that because Γ¯0 is a cofinite
cover, all but finitely many instances of this rule will have a conclusion that is immediately subsumed, either
by an instance of the uL or uR rule, or by a previously derived sequent. It therefore follows that each inference
rule is applied only finitely many times. Since there are only finitely many subformulas of the end-sequent, this
guarantees that the consequences of the initial sequents are finite.
6 Refinement
As we have now shown, augmenting sequents with cofinite covers for each predicate symbol ensures that the
inverse method with subsumption terminates on all queries. Moreover, we can trivially turn a sequent into an
augmented sequent by adding free atoms of the form ϕ(P ) for every predicate symbol P . This is tantamount
to saying that all predicates are true for all ground instances, which is almost certain to result in an unsound
proof that relies on some ground instance of a free atom. The main goal of this section, then, is to show that
if an unsound proof is found, then we can always refine our cofinite cover to additionally exclude the instance
that lead to this unsoundness.
We start with a few necessary lemmas.
Lemma 16 (Covers refine). If Γ¯⊲ P¯ then any instance P of some P¯ ′ ∈ Γ¯ is an instance of P¯ .
Proof. By structural induction on the derivation of Γ¯ ⊲ P¯ . If this derivation is an instance of imm, the result
is immediate. In the case where the derivation ends in the split rule, apply the induction hypothesis to the
premise Γ¯f ⊲ P¯ [ϕ(f)] for which P¯
′ ∈ Γ¯f to conclude that P is an instance of P¯ [ϕ(f)], hence also an instance of
P¯ [T ], which completes the proof.
Lemma 17 (Strictness). If Γ¯⊲ P¯ and P is an instance of P¯ , then there is exactly one P¯ ′ ∈ Γ¯ such that P is
an instance of P¯ ′.
Proof. By structural induction on the derivation of Γ¯⊲ P¯ . The base case is immediate.
In the case of the split rule, note that for two different function symbols f and f ′, P can never be an instance
of both P¯ [ϕ(f)] and P¯ [ϕ(f ′)], hence exactly one premise will have the property that P is an instance of P¯ [ϕ(f)].
Applying the induction hypothesis to this premise, we conclude that there is exactly one P¯ ′ ∈ Γ¯f such that P
is an instance of P¯ ′. As for the hypotheses present in the other premises, it follows from the previous lemma
that P cannot be an instance of any of these.
Lemma 18 (Ground coverage). If P is a ground instance of P¯ , there exists a Γ¯ such that Γ¯⊲ P¯ , and P is an
instance of a ground cover P¯ ′ ∈ Γ¯.
Proof. Define the surplus of P over P¯ as the difference in the number of function symbols present in either atom
(note that P will always have at least as many function symbols as P¯ ). We will proceed by induction over the
size of the surplus.
Note that if the surplus is zero, then P¯ is necessarily ground, hence we may put Γ¯ = P¯ . If the surplus is
non-zero, there must exist a type T and linear context P¯ [T ] such that the corresponding subterm in P is some
function symbol f ′ with codomain T .
Consider the following derivation
D
·
·
·
Γ¯f ′ ⊲ P¯ [ϕ(f
′)] ∀f ∈ SC(T ) \ {f ′}.
imm
P¯ [ϕ(f)]⊲ P¯ [ϕ(f)]
split
Γ¯f ′ ,
⊎
f∈SC(T )\{f ′}
P¯ [ϕ(f)] ⊲ P¯ [T ]
As P¯ [ϕ(f ′)] has one more function symbol than P¯ [T ], the surplus has decreased, hence we may apply the
induction hypothesis to P¯ [ϕ(f ′)] and P to get the derivation D, which completes the proof.
By iterating the above lemma, we get the following easy corollary.
Corollary 19. For any set Γ of ground instances of a predicate P , there exists a Γ¯ such that Γ¯⊲ P¯ and every
P ′ ∈ Γ has a ground cover in Γ¯.
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Lemma 20 (Refinement). For any set Γ of ground instances of a predicate P there exists a cofinite cover Γ¯◮ P¯
such that no P ′ ∈ Γ is an instance of some P¯ ′ ∈ Γ¯.
Proof. From the previous corollary, it follows that we may find a Γ¯ such that Γ¯ ⊲ P¯ , and every P ′ ∈ Γ has a
ground cover in Γ¯. Let Γ¯′ be the subset of ground covers in Γ¯. It is now immediate that Γ¯ \ Γ¯′ ◮ P¯ .
Remark 21. Note that simply doing case splitting and discarding ground covers does not necessarily result in
a minimal cofinite cover. Consider a binary predicate P over nat for which we wish to exclude P (s(z), s(z)).
By the above procedure, we could get e.g. the following cofinite cover:
P 〈z, s〈nat〉〉, P 〈s〈nat〉, z〉, P 〈s〈s〈nat〉〉, s〈nat〉〉, P 〈s〈z〉, s〈s〈nat〉〉〉,
which excludes exactly the atoms P (z, z) and P (s(z), s(z)). Note however, that the following would also work
as a cofinite cover, and additionally exclude P (z, s(z)) and P (s(z), z):
P 〈nat, s〈s〈nat〉〉, P 〈s〈s〈nat〉〉, nat〉.
This is more of an implementation detail, however, as the specifics of which cofinite cover is chosen makes no
difference with regard to saturation.
Theorem 22 (Refinement of sequents). Given a proof of Γ −→ A augmented with Γ¯ it is possible to check
whether this proof is also a valid proof of Γ −→ A. If the proof is not valid, it is possible to refine the set Γ¯ into
Γ¯′ such that the derivation is not a valid proof of the sequent Γ −→ A augmented with Γ¯′.
Proof. From the inference rules, it follows that the only way the elements of Γ¯ interact with derivations is
through the uL and uR rules. It therefore follows that if no instances of these rules appear in the proof, then
the proof is in fact a valid proof even in the absence of Γ¯. If, on the other hand, some P¯ ∈ Γ¯ is used in the
proof, it must be in the form of a uL or uR rule, e.g.
Γ′′ −→ P
uR
Γ′′ −→ P ′
In this case, we may use Lemma 20 to get a new set Γ¯′P , for which P is not an instance of any P¯
′′ ∈ Γ¯′P , and
replace Γ¯P with Γ¯
′
P , putting Γ¯
′ = Γ¯ \ {Γ¯P }∪ Γ¯
′
P . This precludes P from being used as the premise of the above
uR rule in a proof of Γ −→ A augmented with Γ¯
′.
With these two theorems in place, we may now perform our proof search as follows. To find a proof of
Γ −→ A, first augment it with a suitable Γ¯. Use the inverse method to search for a proof of this sequent. If it
terminates without proof, Γ −→ A is unprovable. If it terminates with a sound proof, Γ −→ A is provable. If
it terminates with an unsound proof, refine Γ¯ into Γ¯′, and repeat with Γ¯′ in place of Γ¯.
7 Implementation
While the description of the inverse method in the previous section used free terms and free atoms, and required
a means of building the full proofs, in an actual implementation we dispense with them entirely. Indeed, we
need very little beyond the ordinary inverse method for first-order intuitionistic logic, and these alterations are
explained below.
Recall that when defining free atoms we suggested that one should consider the types T occurring in a free
atom P¯ as representing all instances of that type. This suggests that one may interpret T as a universally
quantified variable. More formally, we have the following definition:
Definition 23. The judgment Ψ ⊢ t¯ 7→ t represents a mapping from free terms to terms in a context Ψ of typed
eigenvariables. It is defined by the following inference rules
x : T ⊢ T 7→ x
Ψ1 ⊢ t¯1 7→ t1 · · · Ψn ⊢ t¯n 7→ tn
Ψ1, . . . ,Ψn ⊢ γ〈t¯1, . . . , t¯n〉 7→ γ(t1, . . . , tn)
where γ is either a function or predicate symbol. We furthermore require that all variables occurring in Ψ are
distinct.
Note that up to renaming of the variables in Ψ, the derivation of the judgment Ψ ⊢ t¯ 7→ t is unique for any
given t¯, hence the above defines a function from free atoms to atoms in a context of eigenvariables.
We may now define the interpretation of free atoms as follows
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Definition 24. Let αL, αR be functions defined by the following equations:
αL(P¯ ) = ((∀Ψ.P ) ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ((∃Ψ.P ) ⊃ ⊥) where Ψ ⊢ P¯ 7→ P
αR(P¯ ) = (∃Ψ.P ) ⊃ (∀Ψ.P ) where Ψ ⊢ P¯ 7→ P
We define the function α on covers as α(Γ¯) = αL(Γ¯), αR(Γ¯). Note that this maps covers to contexts in FJ.
Theorem 25 (Equivalence). The following methods are equivalent, in the sense that they are both terminating
for the same choice of Γ and A:
• the polarized and focused inverse method for the end-sequent Γ −→ A augmented with Γ¯ and using the uL
and uR rules; and
• the polarized and focused inverse method for the end-sequent Γ, α(Γ¯) −→ A without using the uL and uR
rules.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that for every free atom P¯ ∈ Γ¯, the synthetic inference rule that arises from
focusing on α(P¯ ) corresponds exactly to an instance of the uL or uR rules. As we assume all atoms have
negative polarity, the focusing phase and synthetic inference rules have the following forms for the uR rule:
·
·
·
Γ −→ ψ(P )
∃R
...
Γ −→ ∃Ψ.P
init
ψ′(P ) −→ ψ′(P )
∀L
...
∀Ψ.P −→ ψ′(P )
⊃L
Γ, (∃Ψ.P ) ⊃ (∀Ψ.P ) −→ ψ′(P )
·
·
·
Γ −→ ψ(P )
{Ψ}
Γ, (∃Ψ.P ) ⊃ (∀Ψ.P ) −→ ψ′(P )
where ψ and ψ′ are substitutions that instantiate all variables in Ψ. This exactly matches the uR rule. The
case for the uL rule is similar.
Despite this rather pleasing equivalence, there is a major implementation hurdle: if the α(Γ¯) assumptions
were in the end-sequent, then they would be globalized, meaning that they would be deleted in the specialized left
rules for these hypotheses. This is always sound because the assumptions in the end-sequent may be assumed to
be implicilty present in every forward sequent, so the deletion is just a variant of the factor rule. However, this
would mean that the only way to access the corresponding instances of uL and uR, which is necessary for the
refinement procedure, would be to keep the full derivations around during search. This is an insurmountable
cost in the forward direction because of the memory pressure caused by conjunctive non-determinism. Indeed,
it even induces a significant time overhead for the search loop as every forward inference requires copying the
full premise. (Recall that every lifted forward sequent stands for all its instances, and it may well be that
incompatible instances of the same sequent are needed in different parts of a derivation.)
Our approach to this is not to globalize the α(Γ¯) assumption, but to instead keep them around in the
constructed sequents. It is then immediately obvious when a sequent is unsound: since forward sequents have
only relevant hypotheses, we merely have to see that a α(P¯ ) (for some P ) occurs among them. However, this
induces two new kinks: (1) different selections of unsound assumptions may counteract subsumption, even
though the corresponding derivations with uL and uR would be fine, and (2) if the instantiation terms were kept
in addition to the unsound assumptions, then they may violate the eigenvariable check for the ∀R and ∃L rules.
To solve this, we use a more relaxed subsumption relation.
Definition 26 (Relaxed Subsumption). The sequent Γ0, α(Γ¯
′
0) −→ γ0 subsumes Γ1, α(Γ¯
′
1) −→ γ1 iff Γ0 −→ γ0
subsumes Γ1 −→ γ1.
It is clear that this relation coincides with ordinary subsumption on sound sequents, i.e., sequents that
contain no instances of α(P¯ ). It is also equivalent to the globalized version, which would always have deleted
the unsound hypotheses, so by Theorems 25 and 15 it retains its termination properties.
As mentioned above, keeping entire proofs around is quite costly. On the other hand, we would like the
prover to be able to construct an actual sequent calculus proof if it manages to derive a sequent that subsumes
the goal. To facilitate this, we instead store a proof skeleton for each derived sequent. This skeleton keeps track
of which rules appear in the corresponding proof tree, and in what order, but not what the principal formulas
were.
To ensure soundness, we reconstruct the full proof based on the proof skeleton by using it to direct a simple
backtracking search. This is done using an OCaml implementation of the Foundational Proof Certificates [7]
approach.
We have implemented a polarized and focused inverse method prover with support the relaxed subsumption
(and hence free atoms) described above. This prover, called Mætning, is available from the following URL.
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ILTP Status #Problems Refuted <1s Refuted <60s Timeout
Open 93 20 0 73
Non-theorem 56 48 0 8
Table 1: Results of testing Mætning on non-propositional, non-equality SYN problems from the ILTP.
https://github.com/chaudhuri/maetning
From the ILTP [15], we tested the prover on every problem marked “Open” or “Non-theorem” from the SYN
category which was not propositional, and did not contain any equality. A timeout of 1 minute was used. The
results can be seen in Table 1. It should be noted that the vast majority of these are already refutable without
the addition of cofinite covers, hence an inverse method prover such as Imogen should succeed in refuting them
as well. On the other hand, even simple examples such as the one in the introduction fail to be refutable by
Imogen. In short, anything Imogen refutes is also refuted by Mætning, but the converse is not true. The results
may be found at the aforementioned URL.
8 Related work
Our approach is similar in many respects to that of Lynch et al. [11, 3]. In [3], the authors present a combination
of a superposition-based system and SMT solver that uses so-called “speculative inferences” to keep the search
space finite, at a possible loss of soundness. One major difference is that our approach can be straightforwardly
applied to nonclassical logics that can be implemented in the inverse method. Moreover, if our method termi-
nates with an unsound proof, this unsoundness can be used to automatically and intelligently refine the proof
search to ensure that the same proof isn’t discovered again.
Another similar approach is McCune’s Mace [12]. Given a set of first-order formulas, Mace attempts to
find a model satisfying these formulas by an exhaustive search of all ground instances for a given domain size.
If no model is found, the domain size is increased, yielding an iterative deepening algorithm. However, the
deepening process is “blind” in the sense that a failure at a certain depth is not itself informative.
The closest related work to the present paper is on dynamic polarity assignment [5] in the inverse method.
The main goal of that paper is similar – to use the inverse method to perform proof search in such a way that
forward reasoning is guaranteed to terminate. There are, however, substantial differences: the input in [5] is a
collection of Horn clauses that is assumed to be both mode-correct and terminating on all well-moded queries.
In constrast, our method does not require anything apart from the presence of forward subsumption. On the
other hand, any solution found through dynamic polarity assignment is guaranteed to be sound, whereas with
our approach, a separate check of soundness is required; furthermore, that procedure runs exactly once, whereas
we may need to iterate with refinements.
9 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we have shown how having more hypotheses available can turn a proof search procedure that
doesn’t necessarily terminate into one that is guaranteed to terminate. Furthermore, we have shown that this
guarantee can be achieved without any changes to the core theorem proving procedure. Although our primary
focus in this paper was intuitionistic first-order logic, we expect that it should be possible to generalize the
results of this paper to many other logics with first-order quantification. The method we have presented is
simple, relying on the use of forward subsumption to cull the search space down to a finite subset of derivable
sequents.
Currently, the implementation does not provide a certificate witnessing the nonprovability of a given goal.
For refutations, one could in principle simply output the final, saturated database of sequents. Checking the
validity of this refutation would then consist of running a simplified version of the Otter loop, checking that in
no case is it possible to derive a sequent that is not immediately subsumed. Such a certificate could be quite
big, however, and it might therefore be useful to investigate whether the database can be used to construct
other witnesses of non-provability, for instance Kripke countermodels.
Ultimately, the power of this approach stems from the use of subsumption in the inverse method. It would
be interesting to see if a similar approach works for the more traditional top-down proof search as well.
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